Cumplimiento fiscal y bienes públicos. ¿Son realmente compatibles?
Contenido principal del artículo
Resumen
Descargas
Detalles del artículo
Esta obra está bajo una https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.es.
Creado a partir de la obra en http://www.eltrimestreeconomico.com.mx/index.php/te/index
Nota: la licencia de creative commons sólo aplica para la sección Artículos, para el contenido de las otras secciones, véase cada texto.
Métricas PlumX
Citas
Allingham, Michael G., y Agnar Sandmo (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis”, Journal of Public Economics 1, pp. 323-338.
Alm, James (1991), A Perspective on the Experimental Analysis of Taxpayer Reporting”, The Accounting Review 63, pp. 577-593.
--, Gary H. McClelland y William D. Schulze (1992), “Why do People Pay Taxes?”, Journal of Public Economics 48, pp. 21-38.
--, Betty Jackson y Michael McKee (1992), “Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data”, National Tax Journal 45, pp. 107-114.
--, -- y – (1993), “Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions, and Tax Compliance”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 22, pp. 285-303.
--, Isabel Sánchez y Ana de Juan (1995), “Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance”, Kyklos 48, pp. 3-18.
Andreoni, James, Brian Erard y Jonathan Feinstein (1998), “Tax Compliance”, Journal of Economic Literature 36, pp. 818-860.
Baldry, J. C. (1987), “Income Tax Evasion and the Tax Schedule: Some Experimental Results”, Public Finance 422, pp. 357-383.
Becker, W., H. J. Buchner y S. Sleeking (1987), “The Impact of Public Transfer Expenditures”, Journal of Public Economics 34, pp. 243-252.
Bosco, Luigi, y Luigi Mittone (1997), “Tax Evasion and Moral Constraints: Some Experimental Evidence”, Kyklos 50, pp. 297-324.
Clotfelter, C. T. (1983), “Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns”, The Review of Economics and Statistics 65, pp. 363-373.
Cowell, Frank A. y James P. F. Gordon (1988), “Unwillingness to Pay”, Journal of Public Economics 36, pp. 305-321.
Crane, S. E., y F. Nourzad (1986), “Inflation and Tax Evasion: An Empirical Analysis”, The Review of Economics and Statistics 68, pp. 217-223.
Cummings, R. G., J. Martínez-Vazquez y Michael McKee (2001), Cross Cultural Comparisons of Tax Compliance Behavior, Georgia State University, Ensayo de Trabajo 01-3.
Davis, Douglas D., y Charles A. Holt (comps.) (1992), Experimental Economics, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Doob, Anthony, y Cheryl M. Webster (2003), “Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis”, Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 30, pp. 143-195.
Dornstein, M. (1976), “Compliance With legal and Bureaucratic Rules: The Case of Self-employed Taxpayers in Israel”, Human Relations 29, pp. 1019-1034.
Dublin, Jeffey A., y Louis L. Wilde (1988), “An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance”, National Tax Journal 41, pp. 61-74.
--, Michael J. Graetz y Louis L. Wilde (1990), “The Effects of Audit Rates on the Federal Income Tax 1977-1986”, National Tax Journal 43, pp. 395-409.
Fehr, Ernst, y Simon Gächter (2000), Cooperation and Punishment in Public Good Experiments”, American Economic Review 90, pp. 980-994.
Friedland, N. S. Maital y A. Rutenberg (1978), “A Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion”, Journal of Public Economics 8, pp. 107-116.
Grasmick, Harold G., y Robert J. Bursik, Jr. (1990), “Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model”, Law and Society Review 24, pp. 837-861.
Isaac, R. Mark, James M. Walker y Susan H. Thomas (1984), “Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An Experimental Explanation of Possible Explanations”, Public Choice 43, pp. 113-149.
--, Kenneth F. McCue y Charles R. Plott (1985), “Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment”, Journal of Public Economics 26, pp. 51-74.
Kagel, John H., y Alvin E. Roth (1995), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Nueva Jersey, Princeton University Press.
Kim, Oliver y Mark Walker (1984), “The Free Rider Problem: Experimental Evidence”, Public Choice 43, pp. 3-24.
Plott, Charles R. (1987), “Dimensions of Parallelism: Some Policy Applications of Experimental Methods”, Alvin E. Roth (comp.), Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View, Cambridge University Press.
Poterba, J. M. (1987), “Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation”, American Economic Review 77, pp. 234-239.
Roth, Alvin (comp.) (1987), Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
--, et al (1991), “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokio: An Experimental Study”, American Economic Review 81, pp. 1068-1095.
Roth, Jeffrey A., John T. Scholz y Ann Dryden Witte (1989), Taxpayer Compliance: Social Science Perspectives, Filadelfia, University of Pennsylvania Press.
Slemrod, Joel (1985), “An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 67, pp. 232-238.
Smith, L. Vernon (1982), “Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science”, American Economic Review 72, pp. 923-955.
-- (1991), Papers in Experimental Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Spicer, Michael W., y S. B. Lundstedt (1976), “Understanding Tax Evasion”, Public Finances 31, pp. 295-305.
-- y R. E. Hero (1985), “Tax Evasion and Heuristics. A Research Note”, Journal of Public Economics 26, pp. 263-267.
Webley, Paul, et al (1991), Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach, Londres, Cambridge University Press.
Witte, Ann D., y Diane F. Woodbury (1983), “What We Know About the Factors Affecting Compliance with the Tax Laws”, Sawicki Phillip (comp.), Income Tax Compliance: A Report of the ABA Section of Taxation Invitational Conference on Income Tax Compliance.
Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1974), “A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis”, Journal of Public Economics 3, pp. 201-202.