Atribución de la responsabilidad y voto económico. El caso de España

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Antonio M. Jaime Castillo
José Luis Sáez Lozano

Resumen

Hasta la aparición de los primeros estudios centrados en la hipótesis de la claridad, la teoría del voto económico asumía implícitamente que el gobierno es responsable de la situación económica del país. A diferencia de los trabajos basados en la hipótesis de la claridad en la responsabilidad, en este artículo suponemos que los electores racionales tienen incertidumbre al momento de responsabilizar al Ejecutivo y son neutrales ante el riesgo. A partir de ahí, definimos una función de utilidad con dos argumentos: la valoración sociotrópica prospectiva y la distancia ideológica entre el votante y las diferentes opciones políticas entre las que puede elegir. De este modo, la decisión de voto económico consta de dos etapas: por una parte, el elector atribuye subjetivamente la responsabilidad al gobierno, y por otra, decide su opción de voto en función de la valoración sociotrópica prospectiva y la distancia ideológica. De los contrastes y estimaciones realizadas en este estudio se extraen tres grandes conclusiones: i) que no se puede seguir asumiendo que la atribución de la responsabilidad es un supuesto implícito al voto económico, ii) existe una probabilidad subjetiva de que el elector responsabilice al Ejecutivo de la situación económica del país, que afecta a su decisión individual y también condiciona el efecto de los factores explicativos del comportamiento electoral, y iii) que la ideología es un argumento de la función de utilidad, que no podemos obviar tal y como tradicionalmente ha hecho la teoría del voto económico.
Palabras clave:
responsabilidad, gobierno, elector, voto, economía, función de utilidad, teoría de la decisión

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