Comercio estratégico y políticas ambientales para las industrias oligopólicas

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Alberto Gallegos
Pierre Régibeau

Resumen

En este artículo nos ocupamos de la relación entre el comercio internacional y la contaminación endógena con un mecanismo en que la política comercial proporciona al gobierno nacional una advertencia creíble que influye en el comportamiento estratégico de las empresas para adoptar tecnologías más limpias. El gobierno tiene un incentivo mayor para proteger una industria limpia que para proteger a una muy contaminante. En este sentido, una economía abierta localmente contaminada con una estructura de mercado imperfectamente competitiva tenderá a disminuir las emisiones de contaminantes en mayor medida que con un régimen autárquico. Un compromiso con el libre comercio sería contraproducente: eliminaría la capacidad del gobierno para amenazar creíblemente a los niveles de protección más bajos. Demostramos que cualquier liberación del comercio podría disminuir el bienestar del país.
Palabras clave:
administración comercial, liberación comercial, contaminación local

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