La cultura como factor condicionante e inercial del desarrollo económico

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Gonzalo Castañeda

Resumen

El artículo analiza el desarrollo económico mediante un proceso coevolutivo, en el que instituciones formales vinculadas al estado de derecho se transforman a la par de valores culturales. A partir de este proceso se abre la posibilidad de equilibrios múltiples y, por ende, se explica el atraso económico por la presencia de una cultura “oportunista” que se desenvuelve en un entorno de ilegalidad. Por medio de un modelo de teoría de juegos evolutivos se muestra que un panorama de bajo ingreso per capita resulta muy difícil de erradicar, tanto por la existencia de la inercia cultural propia de la coevolución como por la relevancia que tienen factores remotos (geográficos y socioculturales) en la probabilidad de que la economía haya tomado una determinada senda de crecimiento.
Palabras clave:
cultura, desarrollo económico, teoría de juegos evolutivos, coevolución, trayectoria de dependencia

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