Economía política neoclásica y la América Latina. Una mirada a la bibliografía

Contenido principal del artículo

Claudio A. Bonilla
Leonardo A. Gatica

Resumen

Desde los inicios de la ciencia económica, política y economía han estado ligadas. El estudio de la interacción entre estos dos campos ha dado origen a lo que hoy conocemos como economía política. Sin embargo, el término de economía política es un concepto general que abarca una amplia gama de escuelas de pensamientos que sería imposible analizar en un solo artículo. El presente trabajo entrega una revisión de la bibliografía de las principales aportaciones que la escuela de economía política neoclásica ha hecho al entendimiento del accionar de los gobiernos. Particular acento es puesto en analizar ejemplos de la economía política neoclásica aplicada a países de la América Latina.

Descargas

Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.

Detalles del artículo

Cómo citar
Bonilla, C. A., & Gatica, L. A. (2024). Economía política neoclásica y la América Latina. Una mirada a la bibliografía. El Trimestre Económico, 72(285), 179–211. Recuperado a partir de https://www.eltrimestreeconomico.com.mx/index.php/te/article/view/581
Sección
Notas y Comentarios Bibliográficos

Citas

Acemoglu, Daron, y James A. Robinson (2001), “Inefficient Redistribution”, American Political Science Review 95, PP. 649-662.

Aghion, Philippe, y Patrik Bolton (1990), “Government Domestic Debt and Risk Default: A Political-Economic Model of a Strategic Role of Debt”, Rudiger Dronbush y Mario Dragih (comps.), Public Debt Management: Theory and History, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press.

Alesina, Alberto (1987), “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, pp. 651-678.

--, G. Cohen y N. Roubini (1992), “Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Countries democracies”, Economics and Politics 4, pp. 1-30.

--, y Guido Tabellini (1990), “A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt”, Review of Economic Studies 57, pp. 403-414.

--, y A. Drazen (1991), “Why Stabilizations are Delayed”, American Economic Review, 81, pp. 1170-1188.

--, N. Roubini y G. Cohen (1997), Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, Cambridge, MIT Press.

Ames, Barry (1987), Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America, Berkley, University of California Press.

-- (1994), “Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation”, American Journal of Political Science 39, 2, pp. 406-433.

-- (1995), “Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel”, Journal of Politics 57, 2, pp. 324-343.

-- (1996), Soft Theory, Hard Evidence: Rational Choice and Empirical Investigation in Brazil, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center, Latinamerican Program, Working Paper núm. 217.

-- (2001), The Deadlock of democracy in Brazil, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.

Arrow, Ken (1951), Social Choice and Individual Values, New Heaven, Yale University Press.

Austen-Smith, David, y Jeffrey Banks (1988), “Elections Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes”, American Political Science Review 82, pp. 401-422.

-- y J. S. Banks (2000), Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference, The University of Michigan Press.

Baldez, Lisa, y John Carey (1999), “Presidential Agenda Control and Spending Policy: Lessons from General Pinochet’s Constitution”, American Journal of Political Science 43, 1, pp. 29-55.

Banks, Jeffrey (1991), Signaling Games in Political Science, Chur. Suiza, Harwood Academic Publishers.

Barro, Robert, y David Gordon (1983), “Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics 12, pp. 101-120.

Bates, Robert, A. Greif, M. Levi, J-L. Rosenthal y B. Weingast (2000), “The Analitical Narrative Project”, Americn Political Science Review 94, 3, pp. 696-702.

Benton, Allison Lucinda (2004), “The Strategic Struggle for Patronage: Political Careers, State Largesse and Factionalism in Latin America”, Journal of Theoretical Politics.

Besley, T. y A. Case (2003), “Political Institutions and Policy Choice: Evidence form the United States”, Journal of Economic Literature 41(1), pp. 7-73.

--, y S. Coate (1997), “An Economic Model of a Representative Democracy”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(1), pp. 85-114.

--, y – (1998), “Sources of Inefficiencies in a Representative Democracy: Adynamic Analysis”, American Economic Review 85(1), pp. 139-156.

Black, Duncan (1958), The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge, Inglaterra, Cambridge University Press.

Bonilla, C. (2004a), “A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology”, por aparecer en Public Choice.

-- (2004b), “Una Nota en Economía Política Aplicada: Nueva Evidencia de Chile”, Manuscrito, Universidad del Desarrollo, Chile.

Buchanan James M., y Gordon Tullock (1962), The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Rames D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson y Alastair Smith (2003), The Logic of Political Survival, Cambridge, MIT Press.

Calvert, R. (1985), “Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidates’ Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence. American Journal of Political Science 29, pp. 69-95.

Cameron, Maxwell (1994), Democracy and Authoritarism in Peru, Nueva York, St. Martin’s.

Cardoso, E., y A. Helwege (1993), La economía latinoamericana. Diversidad, tendencias y conflictos, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica.

-- (1995), “Latin America’s Economy: Diversity, Trends and Conflicts”, MIT Press.

Carey, John y Matthew Shugart (1995), “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote”, Electoral Studies 14, 4, pp. 417-439.

Colomer, Joseph M., y Gabriel L. Negretto (2002), “Governance with Divided Powers”, artículo presentado en 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 29 de agosto-1° de septiembre.

Coughlin, P. (1984), “Expectations About Voter Choices: A Comment”, Public Choice 44, pp. 49-59.

Cox, Gary (1987), “Electoral Equilibrium Under Alternatives Voting Institutions”, American Journal of Political Science 31, pp. 82-108.

-- (1990), “Multicandidate Spatial Competition”, James Enelow y Melvin Hinich (comps), Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crisp, Brian (2000), “Programmatic vs. Parochial Bill Initiation in Six Latin American Democracies”, artículo presentado en la 96o congreso de la American Political Science Association (APSA), Washington.

Davis, Otto, y Melvin Hinich (1966), “A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation en Democratic Societies”, In Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II. (Editors) Joseph Benvd., Dallas, Southern Methodist University Press.

Davis, Otto, y Melvin Hinich (1968), “On the Power and Importance of the Mean Preferences in a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice”, Public Choice 5.

--, Morris Degroot y Melvin J. Hinich (1972), “Social Preference Ordering and Majority Rule”, Econometrica 40, pp. 147-157.

Dixit, Avinash, y Londregan (1996), “The Determinants of Success of Special Interest in Redistributive Politics”, Journal of Politics, LVIII, pp. 497-530.

-- y – (1998), “Ideology, Tactics and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIII, pp. 497-530.

Dornbusch, R., y S. Edwards (comps.), (1992), Macroeconomía del populismo en la América Latina, Lecturas de EL TRIMESTRE ECONÓMICO, 75, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Doron, Gideon y Itai Sened (2001), Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process, California, SAGE Publications Inc.

Dow, Jay (1998a), “A Spatial Analysis of Candidates Competition in Dual Member Districts: the 1989 Chilean Senatorial Election”, Public Choice 97.

-- (1998b), “A Spatial Analysis of the 1989 Chilean Presidential Election”, Electoral Studies 17, pp. 61-76.

Downs, Anthony (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy. Nueva York, Harper and Row.

Drazen, A. (2000a), Political Economy in Macroeconomics, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

-- (2000b), “The political business cycle after 25 years”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Cambridge, MIT Press.

Edward, Sebastián (1994), “The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Developing Countries”, Economic Development and Cultural Change 42, pp. 235-266.

Enelow, James, y Melvin J. Hinich (1982), “Ideology, Issues, and the Spatial Theory of Elections, American Political Science Review 76, pp. 493-501.

--, y Melvin J. Hinich (1990), “The Theory of Predictive Mappings”, James Enelow y Melvin Hinch (comps), Advances of the Spatial Theory of Voting, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press.

Estévez, Federico, Alberto Díaz Cayeros y Beatriz Magaloni (2002), “The Erosion of One-Party Rule: Clientelism, Portfolio Diversification and Electoral Strategy, artículo presentado en The 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 29 de agosto-1° de septiembre.

Fair, R. (1982), “The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: The 1980 Results”, The Review of Economics and Statistic., mayo, pp. 322-325.

Fair, R. (1988), “The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1984 Update”, Political Behavior. pp. 168-179.

Faust, J., y J. Irons (1999), “Money, Politics and the Post-War Business Cycle”, Journal of Monetary Economics 43, pp. 61-89.

Fearon, James D. (1999), “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance”, Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes y Bernard Main (comps.), Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, Cambridge University Press.

Ferejohn, J. y R. G. Noll (1978), “Uncertainty and the Formal Theory of Political Campaigns”, American Political Science Review 72, pp. 492-505.

Fernández, Raquel, y Dani Rodrick (1991), “Resístanse to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty”, American Economic Review, 81, pp. 1146-1155.

Fiorina, M. P. (1981), Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, New Heaven, Yale University Press.

Fisher, Stanley (1980), “Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation and the Benevolent Dissembling Government”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2, pp. 93-107.

Frieden, J., y E. Stein (comps.) (2001), The Currency Game: Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America, Banco Interamerican Development Bank, Washington, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Gatica, L. A. (2002), “Executive-Legislative Relations and Economic Policy Strategies; the Design of Stabilization Programs”, Universidad de Texas en Austin, Departamento de Economía, manuscrito.

Geddes, Barbara (1991), “A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies”, American Political Science Review, 85, núm. 2, pp. 371-392.

-- (1994), Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America, University of California Press.

-- (1995), “Uses and Limitations of Rational Choice”, Peter H. Smith (comp.), Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis. Boulder: Westview.

-- (1999a). What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years? Annual Review of Political Science II.

-- (1999b), “The Effect of Regime Type on Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument”, artículo presentado en The 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Gerber, E. R., y J. E. Jackson (1990), Endogenous Preferences and the study of institutions, artículo presentado en el congreso anual de la American Political Science Association, San Francisco.

González, Ma. de los Ángeles (2000), “On Elections, Democracy and Macroeconomic Policy”, tesis doctoral, Princeton University.

-- (2002), “Do Changes in Democracy Afect the Political Budget Cycle? Evidence from Mexico”, Review of Development Economics 6(2), pp. 204-224.

Gordon, David M. (1978), “Up and Down the Long Roller Coaster”, U.S. Capitalism in Crisis, Nueva York, Union of Radical Political Economics.

Greene, K. (2002a), “Defeating Dominance: Opposition Party Building and Democratization in Mexico”, tesis doctoral, University of California Berkley.

-- (2002b), “Opposition Party Strategy and Spatial Competition in Dominant Party Regimes: A Theory and the Case of Mexico”, Comparative Political Studies 35 (7), pp. 755-783.

Grier, K. (1989), “On the Existence of a Political Monetary Cycle”, American Journal of Political Science 33, pp. 376-389.

--, y F. Hernández-Trillo (2004), “The Real Exchange Rate Process and its Real Effects: The Case of Mexico and the USA”, Journal of Applied Economics, vol. VII, núm. 1, pp. 1-25.

Haggard, Stephan, y Robert Kaufman (1990), The Political economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Middle Income countries, PRE Working Paper núm. 444, Banco Mundial.

-- (1991), “Inflation and Stabilization”, Gerald E. Meier (comp.), Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries, San Francisco, ICS Press.

Harriss, John, Janet Hunter y Colin M. Lewis (comps.), The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, Nueva York, Routledge.

Hibbs, Douglas (1977), “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policies”, American Political Science Review, diciembre, pp. 1467-1787.

Hinich, Melvin J. (1977), “Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: the Medium Voter Result is an Artifact”, Journal of Economic Theory 16, pp. 208-219.

--, y Michael Munger (1994), Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice, Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press.

--, y Peter Ordeshook (1970), “Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation”, American Political Science Review 64, pp. 772-791.

--, J. D. Ledyard y P. Ordeshook (1972), “Nonvoting and the Existence of Equilibrium Under Majority Rule, Journal of Economic Theory 4, pp. 144-153.

Hirschman, A. O. (1970), Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge, Harvard University Press [publicado en castellano en el FCE].

Hotelling, Harold (1929), “Stability in Competition”, Economic Journal 39, pp. 41-57.

Hunter, Wendy (1998), “Negotiating Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and Chile”, International Studies Quarterly 42, 2, pp. 295-317.

Iversen, T. (1994a), “The Logics of Electoral Politics: Spatial, Directional and Mobilizational Effects, Comparative Political Studies 27(2), pp. 155-189.

-- (1994b), “Political Leadership and Representation in Western European Democracies: A Test of Three Models of Voting”, American journal of Political Science 38, pp. 45-74.

Jaramillo, J., R. Steiner, y N. Salazar (2001), “A Long-lasting Crawling Peg: Political Determinants of Exchange Rate Policy in Colombia”, J. Frieden y E. Stein (comps.), The Currency Game: Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Washington, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Jones, Mark (1995), Electoral Laws and Survival of Presidential Democracies, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.

Kalecki, Michal (1943), “Political Aspects of Full Employment”, The Political Quarterly, vol. XIV, núm. 4, pp. 322-331.

Kessler, T. (2000), “The Mexican Peso Crash: Causes, Consequences and Comeback”, C. Wise y R. Rioett (comps.), Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America, Washington, Brookings Institute.

Key, V. O. Jr. (1966), The Responsible Electorate, Nueva York, Vintage.

Knight, Jack (1992), “Institutions and Social Conflict”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kramer, G. (1977), “A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium”, Journal of Economic Theory 16, pp. 310-334.

Krueger, A., y C. Turan (1993), “The Politics and Economics of Turkish Policy Reform in the 1980’s”, R. Bates y A Krueger (comps.), Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Lakatos, Imre (1978), “Methodology of Science Research Programmes”, J. Worrall y G. P. Currie (comps.), Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Larraín, Felipe, y Paola Assel (1995), “Cincuenta años del ciclo político en Chile”, Cuadernos de Economía, 96, Universidad Católica de Chile.

Ledyard, J. (1984), “The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections, Public Choice 48, pp. 7-41.

Levi, Margaret (1997), “A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis”, Mark Lichbach y Alan Zuckerman (comps.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press.

Leys, Colin (1996), The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, Londres, EAEP Indiana University Press-James Currey.

Lindbeck, Assar, y Jörgen Weibul (1987), “Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition”, Public Choice, LII, pp. 272-297.

Lipset, S. [1960] (1994), Political Man, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lisseri, Alessandro, y Nicloa Persico (2001), The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives, American Economic Review, 91, pp. 225-245.

Londregan, John (2000), Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Madrid, Raul (2003), Retiring the State. The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, y Matthew Shugart (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Mandel, Ernst (1986), Las ondas largas del desarrollo capitalista. La interpretación marxista,. Madrid, Siglo XXI de España Editores.

Maxfield, S. (1997), Gatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Mckelvey, Richard (1976), “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Conrol”, Journal of Economic Theory 12, pp. 472-482.

-- (1979), “General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models”, Econometrica 47, pp. 1085-1111.

Miller, Gary (1997), “The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science”, Journal of Economic Literature 35 (3), pp. 1173-1204.

Morgenstern, Scott (1999a), “Explaining Legislative Politics in Latin America”, S. Morgenstern y B. Nacif (comps.), Legislative Politics in Latin America, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

-- (1999b), “Towards a Model of Latin America Legislatures”, S. Morgenstern y B. Nacif (comps.), Legislative Politics in Latin America, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

-- (2003), “Explaining Voting Unity in the Legislatures of the United States and Latin America”, Washington, LASA.

Morrow, James D. (1996), Game Theory for Political Scientists, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

Mueller, Dennis (1979), Public Choice, Cambridge, Inglaterra, Cambridge University Press.

-- (1997), Public Choice I, Cambridge, Inglaterra, Cambridge University Press.

-- (2003), Public Choice II, Cambridge, Inglaterra, Cambridge University Press.

Murillo, V. (2000), “From Populism to Neoliberalism: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Latin America”, World Politics, vol. 52, núm. 2.

Nacif, Benito (2002), “Policy Making Under Divided Government in Mexico”, artículo presentado en The 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 29 de agosto-1° de septiembre.

Neiman Auerbach, Nancy (2001), States, Banks and Markets: Mexico’s Path to Financial Liberalization in Comparative Perspective, Colorado, Westview Press.

Nordhaus, William (1975), “The Political Business Cycle”, Review of Economic Studies, abril, pp. 169-190.

Obsfeld, M., y K. Rogoff (1995), “The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9.

O’Donnell, Guillermo (1974), Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California.

--, y Philippe Shmitter (1986), Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies: Transformation from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ordeshook, Peter C. (1986), Game Theory and Political Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Panzer, John, y Ricardo Paredes (1991), “The Role of Economic Issues in Elections: The Case of the 1998 Chilean Presidential Referendum”, Public Choice 71, pp. 51-59.

Persson, T., y G. Tabellini (2000), Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge, MIT Press.

-- y L. Svensson (1989), “Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, pp. 325-345.

Phillips, A. W. (1958), “The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957”, Economica, vol. 25, pp. 283-299.

Plott, Charles (1967), “A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibilities Under Majority Rule”, American Economic Review 57, pp. 787-806.

Popkin, S. (1991), The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Przeworski, Adam (1991), Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press.

--, y John Sprague (1986), Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Robinson, James y Thierry Verdier (2002), “The political economy of Clientelism”, Londres, Center of Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper 3205.

Rogoff, K., y A. Sibert (1988), “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy”, Review of Economic Studies 42, pp. 169-190.

-- (1990), “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles”, American Economic Review, 80, pp. 21-36.

Romer, Thomas, y Howard Rosenthal (1978), “The political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo”, Public Choice 33.

Rubinstein, Ariel (1982), “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica, vol. 50(1), pp. 97-109.

-- (1985), “A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences”, Econometrica, vol. 53(5), pp. 1151-1172.

Saari, D. (2001), Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected, Cambridge University Press.

Saint-Paul, G. (2000), “The New Political Economy: A Recent Book by A. Drazen and by T. Persson and G. Tabellini”, Journal of Economic Literature 38 (4), pp. 915-925.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1939), Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, Nueva York, McGraw Hill.

Shepsle, Kenneth (1979), “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models”, American Journal of Political Science 23, pp. 27-59.

--, y Mark Bonchek (1997), Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behaviour, and Institutions, Nueva York, Norton & Company.

Shi, M., y J. Svensson (2002), “Conditional Political Budget Cycles”, CEPR Discussion Paper núm. 3352.

Stein, E., y J. M. Sterb (1999), Elections and the Timing of Devaluations, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Research Department Working Paper 396, Washington.

Stokes, S. C. (1999), “Political parties and democracy”, Annual Reviews of Political Science 2, pp. 243-267.

Tullock, Gordon (1981), “Why So Much Stability?”, Public Choice 37, pp. 189-202.

Waterbury, John (1993), Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey, Cambridge University Press.

Weyland, Kurt (2002), “Limitations of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for the study of Latin American Politics”, Studies in Comparative International Development, 37, 1, pp. 57-85.

Whitehead, Laurence (1990), “Political Explanations of Macroeconomic Management: A Survey”, World Development, vol. 18, núm. 8, pp. 1133-1146.

Wilson, Robert (1971), “Stable Coalition Proposal in Majority Rule Voting”, Journal of Economic Theory 3, pp. 254-272.

Wise, C., y R. Rioett (comps.), (2000), Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America, Washington, Brookings Institute.

Wittman, Donald (1973), “Parties as Utility Maximizers”, American Political Science Review 67, pp. 490-498.

-- (1983), “Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories”, American Political Science Review 77, pp. 142-157.

-- (1995), The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient, University of Chicago Press.