La dinámica industrial y la financiación de las PYME

Contenido principal del artículo

José Miguel Benavente
Alexander Galetovic
Ricardo Sanhueza

Resumen

Las (PYME) pagan más que las empresas grandes por su financiación, se les exigen garantías, se las financia a plazos cortos y muchas no se pueden endeudar. Se piensa que estas prácticas son fallas de mercado que deberían corregirse con intervenciones regulatorias. Sin embargo, nosotros argumentamos que son respuestas apropiadas a i) el mayor costo medio de los préstamos pequeños; ii) el problema de la selección originado por la salida y remplazo de empresas que ocurre en todas las industrias, que es más intenso cuando se trata de PYME; iii) la necesidad de alinear los incentivos de deudores y acreedores cuando la información es asimétrica. Mostramos que estas prácticas también son comunes en países con mercados de capitales desarrollados. Finalmente, proponemos medidas para mejorar la financiación de las PYME.

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Benavente, J. M., Galetovic, A., & Sanhueza, R. (2005). La dinámica industrial y la financiación de las PYME. El Trimestre Económico, 72(286), 217–254. Recuperado a partir de https://www.eltrimestreeconomico.com.mx/index.php/te/article/view/597
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Perspectiva Económica

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