Desempeño y habilidades de los directores generales familiares en un contexto de debilidad de las instituciones formales

Karen Watkins-Fassler, Guadalupe del Carmen Briano-Turrent, Lázaro Rodríguez-Ariza

Resumen


Antecedentes: desde la perspectiva de la teoría institucional, este artículo estudia la relación entre las habilidades de los directores generales pertenecientes a la familia y el desempeño financiero de las empresas familiares listadas en un entorno caracterizado por la debilidad de las instituciones formales.

Metodología: la muestra se compone de empresas familiares no financieras listadas en la Bolsa Mexicana de Valores durante el periodo 2001−2014. El análisis econométrico utiliza modelos lineales para datos de panel estimados por mínimos cuadrados ordinarios (mco). Para tomar en cuenta la endogeneidad, las regresiones se corren con el método generalizado de momentos (mgm).

Resultados: según los datos reunidos, se obtienen mejores resultados financieros con los directores generales externos que con los directores generales pertenecientes a la familia, a pesar de que sus habilidades, en términos de experiencia y formación académica, son similares. La relación inversa entre directores generales familiares y desempeño financiero es moderada cuando tienen una gran preparación académica en el área de negocios, lo que les permite adquirir las habilidades y la perspectiva amplia necesarias para lidiar con los más elevados costos de transacción y los mayores riesgos empresariales presentes en ambientes caracterizados por la fragilidad institucional en el plano formal, como es el caso en México.

Conclusiones: en un contexto de debilidad institucional, invertir en educación superior en el área de negocios —de alta calidad y proporcionada en el propio país— es una buena estrategia a largo plazo para empresas familiares que quieran promover a un director general de la familia.


Palabras clave


Institutional theory; Family business; Managerial competence; Financial performance; Mexico

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Referencias


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20430/ete.v86i341.657

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